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I. Introduction
The Social Security program traditionally has been a strongly supported
and popular program for providing income protection for workers and their
dependents from old age, death, and disability. Social Security, by most ac-
counts, has been a successful program, particularly in helping to lower the
poverty rate for the elderly from 35.2% in 1959 to 10.2% in 2000.1 Further-
more, accordmgto Current Population Survey (CPS) data, 40.1% ofthe income
that those age sixty-five or over receive comes from Social Security, while for
those age sixty-five or over with incomes in the lowest three quintiles, at least
79.6% of their income is attributable to Social Security benefits. 2 However,
* Craig Copeland, Ph.D., is a Senior Research Associate and the Director of the Social
Security Research Program at the Employee Benefit Research Institute.
1. See JOSEPHDALAKxE U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PoVERTYINI UNIED STATES:
2000, at 4 (2001), available at http-J/www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p60-214.pdf (chart
showing decline in poverty rate for elderly).
2. SeeKENMCDON L INCOEOFTEREDREDPOPULATION,EBRINoTEs (Employee
Benefit Research Inst., Wash., D.C.), June 2001, at 5, 6 tbl3 (table showing distribution of
older population's income by income source). Evidence indicates that CPS data understates the
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analysts currently project that the program will face a financial shortfall. This
shortfall, which many argue could potentially lead to a sustained need to adjust
benefit levels and tax rates if not reformed, has caused many observers to call
for significant changes in the program to address the changing demographics
of the population of the United States.
One of President George W. Bush's campaign platforms was the idea of
adding individual accounts to the Social Security program. He proposed to
create a commission that would fill in the details around the individual ac-
counts by adjusting the "guaranteed" benefit portion and by making other
potential benefit changes necessary to achieve the seventy-five year actuarial
balance standard establishedby Congress. However, strong support still exists
for the program in its present structure. Consequently, attempts to reform the
program are likely to become contentious and drawn-out, particularly because
there are approximately fifteen years before the projected annual costs of the
program exceed its projected annual revenue.
This Article will examine the issues facing the Social Security program
that have prompted discussions about reforming the program. In addition, it
will investigate various potential reform proposals and the issues surrounding
those ideas. It will then consider traditional types ofreforms - benefit cuts and
tax increases - and privatization.
I. Factors Prompting Social Security Reform
According to the 2000 Trustees' Report of the Old-Age Survivors and
Disability Insurance (OASDI) Program, the program is facing an actuarial
deficit of 1.89% of taxable payroll under the report's intermediate assump-
tions.3 The Board of Trustees ofthe Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance
and Disability Insurance Trust Funds expects that, starting in 2015, the level
of revenue coming into the program will be less than the costs, and that
payments to beneficiaries will exhaust the present build-up in the Social
Security trust fund in 2037.4 In addition, the Trustees project a sharp diver-
gence in the cost and income rates ofithe program after 2015.1 For example,
private pension income of the elderly, and therefore overstates the percentage of income that
the elderly receive from Social Security. Regardless, a majority of those age sixty-five or over,
particularly the lowest-income elderly, still appear to receive a majority of their income from
Social Security. See infra Appendix, Chart 1, at 1221.
3. See BD. OF TRUSTEES OF THE FED. Oi-AaE & SURVIVORS INS. & DIsABHnrY INS.
TRUSTFUNDS, THE 2000 ANNUALREPORT OF THEBOARD OF TRUSTEES OF FEDmL O D-AGE
AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND DisABUMrr INSURAN CE TRUST FUNDS 4 (2000) [hereinafter
BOARD OF TRUSTimS], available at http:/www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR00fmdexhtml (table on
actuarial balance).
4. See id. at3-4.
5. See id. at 171 tbl.1llA2 (table comparing income and cost rates).
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the program's cost in 2000 is projected to be 10.34% of taxable payroll, while
the income is projected to be 12.65%.6 However, by 2070, the income rate is
projected to be 13.32% compared to a cost rate of 19.24%.'
These statistics are projections, so one must keep the specific numbers
in perspective, as they are moving targets. For example, in 1990 the projected
actuarial deficit was 0.91% oftaxable payroll." This projected deficit reached
a high of 2.23% in 1997 and subsequently declined to 1.89% in 2000.1 This
reduction occurred without any significant changes to the program.' 0 The
differences in the actuarial deficits resulted from changes in the assumptions
and methods used in making the projections, the evaluation period used, and
the better-than-expected performance in the economy over the last few years.
Consequently, the assumptions used have come under scrutiny by some, but
the resulting projections definitely provide a guide for the status of the pro-
gram, particularly for the changing demographics due to the aging of the
"baby-boom" generation.
The aging of the baby-boom generation is at the core of the fundamental
issue facing the future of the program - the decreasing covered-worker-to-
beneficiary ratio. In 1980, 3.2 covered workers existed for every beneficiary,
and this ratio increased to 3.4 in 2000.1 However, under their intermediate
assumptions, the Trustees expect this covered-worker-to-beneficiary ratio to
fll to 1.9 by 2070.12 This projected decrease is the result of the increases in
life expectancy and the lower birth rates of the generations following the
baby-boom generation. In 1940, a sixty-five-year-old male could expect to
live another 12.7 years, whereas in 2000 a sixty-five-year-old male is expected
to live another 15.8 years.' 3 In addition to the longer life expectancy, a larger
6. Id.; see infra Appendix, Chart 2, at 1222.
7. Id.
8. See id. at 195 tbl.I1D1 (table on long range actuarial balances); see also infra Ap-
pendix, Chart 3, at 1223.
9. Id.
10. One could consider the elimination of the earnings test for those at the normal retire-
ment age or older during this period to be significant However, due to the actuarial adjustments
that the program has established, this change did not impact the projected actuarial balance of
the program.
11. See DOARD OF TRUSTES, supra note 3, at 122 tblJILF19 (table on OASDI covered
workers); see also infra Appendix, Chart4, at 1224.
12. Id.
13. See C. EUGENE STEUERL.E & JONM. BAK UARETOOUNG SOCIAL SECURITYFOR THE
21sT CENTURY: RIGHT&WRONGAPPROACHESTOREFORM 41 tbl.3.1 (1994) (table showing
distribution of historical and projected improvements in life expectancies). The Trustees' life
expectancy assumptions changed significantly in the 2000 report to reflect the increasing life
expectancies of the elderly, causing a change in the actuarial balance of approximately 0.10%
of taxable payroll. See BOARD OF TRUSTEES, supra note 3, at 4. This recalculation increased
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percentage of individuals will survive to the age of sixty-five. Fifty-three
percent of males who were twenty-one years in 1896 survived to age sixty-
five.14 Analysts expectthis number to increase to 76.0% for those who turned
twenty-one in 1956.1
Another issue surrounding the Social Security debate is the present build-
up in the OASI and DI trust funds. The 2000 Trustees' report indicates these
assets will reach $3,034.7 billion (constant 2000 dollars) by 2019.16 These
trust fund assets plus the program's revenues are expected to be sufficient to
pay current law benefits through 2037.17 However, the assets in the trust funds
are U.S. government special issue treasury bonds. Therefore, when these
assets are needed, the federal government will have to cut spending elsewhere
in the budget, raise taxes, or issue more debt to the public to fulfill these
obligations to the Social Security program.
Some view this build-up in the trust fund as a negative factor, because,
until recently, the government was spending the assets in the trust fund for
other federal programs and leaving IOUs in the trust funds. Some argue that
this practice has allowed federal government spending to increase faster than
it otherwise would. They argue that the government should divert the trust
fund assets to assets other than government treasuries. This diversion would
prevent the government from spending the money for any programs other than
Social Security and would eliminate the need to incorporate the redemption
of the special issue treasury bonds into the budget. Furthermore, critics ofthe
trust funds also argue that the trust funds give a false sense of security for the
program, as taxpayers ultimately are responsible for the redemption of the
bonds. Therefore, one should evaluate the total tax impact of a reform, which
includes changes in federal income taxes as well as payroll tax changes.
Ideology is also a strong factor in the discussions about the reform of
Social Security. The increased sponsorship in the private sector of defined
contribution pension plans relative to defined benefit plans and the rapidly
increasing stock market created a growing acceptance and expectation by
individuals and lawmakers that individuals should be responsible for their
the further life expectancy of a male turning sixty-five in 2000 to 15.9 years and from the 17.5
years projected in the 1999 Board of Trustees' report to 18.1 years in the 2000 report for male
turning sixty-five in 2040. See id. at 63 tbLILD2 (table on life expectancy); BD. OF TRUSTEES
OF THE FED. OLD-AGE & SuRvivoRs INs. & DISABu-Y INS. TRUST FUNDS, THE 1999 ANNuAL
REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND S RViVORS INSURANCE AND
DISABHu.Y INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 63 tbLULD2 (1999), available at http'/Iwww.ssa.gov/
OACT/TRITR99index.html (table on life expectancy).
14. See STEUERLE & BAKIJA, supra note 13, at 41 tbl.3.1 (table on life expectancy).
15. See id.
16. In year 2000 dollars, the trust fund is projected to contain $6,047.6 billion by 2024.
See BOARD OF TRUSTEES, supra note 3, at 179 tbl.1I11B2 (chart showing trust fund estimates).
17. See id. at4.
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retirement savings. However, there are also those who believe that individuals
should not incur the risks of investing in the stock market and point to the
recent tremendous decline in stock market indexes for support. While stocks
have traditionally outperformed other types of investment vehicles in the long
run, short-term swings in market values, as the United States experienced
during late 2000 and early 2001, can affect stocks significantly. These swings
can greatly alter individuals' retirement income depending upon whether they
are eligible for Social Security benefits at the top or bottom of the swings.
Critics of individual accounts argue that the government (all taxpayers) - not
the beneficiaries - should face this risk. The program instead should retain
its defined benefit structure.
I. Types of Reform
The Social Security program's most recent reforms have involved adjust-
ing the basic benefit formula and eligibility ages or raising the payroll tax to
cover the present level of benefits. In the past, a tax increase was an easier
sell because the program added benefits or faced an immediate inability to pay
benefits, as happened in 1983. Tax increases are a much more difficult sell
when the "crisis" is fifteen years or thirty-seven years off (depending upon
one's perception ofthe "crisis" date) and when there is talk of cutting benefits.
Yet, if real income continues to increase as the Trustees' Report projects, then
after-tax income could still increase despite an increase in the payroll tax.
Thus, a tax increase would not necessarily make individuals worse-off after
taxes in the future. One drawback of tax increases is that pay-back ratios and
rates of return would become even lower for future generations, who already
are experiencing declining rates of return due to the changing demographics
and past tax increases.
The other major change to Social Security during 1983, aside from pay-
roll tax increases, was the increase in the normal retirement age. A compell-
ing reason for this adjustment is that longevity has increased steadily since the
inception of the program, but the normal retirement age has not changed.
Consequently, beneficiaries on average were collecting more years of benefits
without working any more years. However, a higher normal retirement age
could be quite burdensome for those workers in strenuous jobs that require a
great deal of lifting or standing, as it is difficult for them to work in their later
years. This issue would plague any future increases in the normal retirement
age. Yet, as the percentage of white-collar jobs increases and the ratio of
workers to beneficiaries continues to decline, the increase in the retirement
age is an incentive for more people who can work to remain employed. Thus,
the system benefits in two ways - beneficiaries wait longer to collect benefits,
and they continue to pay payroll taxes.
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Another widely discussed traditional reform is the adjustment of the con-
sumer price index (CPI), used to index benefits, to counteract the effects of
inflation. The CPI has been criticized for overstating the increase in prices in
the general economy because, as prices change, consumers' expenditure prior-
ities change in awaythe CPI cannot fully capture. However, the goods that the
elderly typically buy are not those that are easily interchangeable with other
goods, such as food and housing. In addition, the elderly on average spend
more money on health care than those under age sixty-five, and health care
inflation has been steadily higher than the overall CPI. Thus, the overestimate
of the CPI may not apply as well to the elderly as to those under age sixty-five.
Therefore, under this type of reform, beneficiaries are likely to face continually
declining real benefits as they become older.
Increasing the retirement age and adjusting the CPI have been widely-
discussed ways to cut the benefits now promised in law, but various other ways
to cut benefits are available." A reason to consider reform options that cut
benefits is that, as the economy grows, the current benefit formula increases the
real benefits that future generations will receive. Consequently, beneficiaries
will enjoy the proceeds ofthe increased growth they helped produce while they
were working. To understand the magnitude of these increasing benefits, a
10% reduction in the projected benefits for average wage workers would cause
the average wage worker's real benefit in 2010 to be virtually identical to its
2000 level. A 20% reduction in future benefits would allow the average wage
worker to have the same real benefit level by 2030 as those retiring in 2000,
and a 30% reduction would return the average wage worker's benefit to its
2000 level by about 2045.19 Thus, in one sense, a future benefit reduction is
not necessarily a cut in benefits. However, cutting benefits lowers beneficia-
ries' return from the program, and the present formula was established because
it was considered important that the living standards of future retirees should
not continually fall behind that of the rest of the economy. Otherwise, the
indexing ofbenefits to prices instead ofto wage growth would be a mechanism
that could greatly reduce the program's projected funding shortfall. Benefit
reductions that allow for increasing real benefits exist, yet the benefits would
not be as large as what the law currently promises.
A second reform option is the collective investment of trust fund assets
in financial instruments other than special issue treasury bonds, particularly
18. Other options include increasing the number of years used to calculate the benefit,
adjusting the bendpoint percentages downward, and indexing the benefit increases by a faction
ofthe growth in wages instead of by all ofthe growth in wages.
19. These are calculations derived from using the projected real benefits for beneficiaries
retiring at age sixty-five and earning the average wage for their entire working years. See BOARD
OF TRusTEEs, supra note 3, at 185 IELB5 (table showing average earnings of persons retiring at
age sixty-five using constant year 2000 dollars); see also infra Appendix, Chart 5, at 1225.
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in equities. This reform could accomplish two tasks. First, equities have
experienced historically higher rates of return than treasury bonds. The trust
fund could garner more income from these higher returns. Second, the federal
government would not be faced with as large an amount of assets needed to
be incorporated into the federal budget with the redemption of special issue
treasury bonds for the Social Security program.2" Underthis scenario, Social
Security could also use the trust funds to indefinitely accumulate additional
assets in order to pre-fund future benefits, making the program more closely
resemble a true defined benefit plan.
While investment in equities is likely to achieve higher rates of return in
the long-term future, the plan comes with additional risk. The stock market
has experienced periods of almost no growth, such as the early 1970s, and
periods of extremely high growth, such as the late 1990s. Consequently, the
trust fund could lose money during some periods; however, prudent manage-
ment of assets could alleviate this problem.
The potential for managing assets that a government agency collectively
holds is troubling for many because the federal government will have some
stake of ownership in private enterprises. These people question whether the
government will make investment choices based on political reasons rather
than on the economic performance of a company. For instance, the govern-
ment might refrain from investing in companies that produce politically
unfavorable but legal products, such as cigarettes, guns, and alcohol. Another
backdoor form of regulation also could occur if the government is allowed to
vote in shareholder elections. If so, the federal government would have the
potential to influence public companies' behavior in ways that would not help
such companies' performance or serve their long-term best interests, which
would potentially defeat the purpose of investment in equities. Furthermore,
the government could face conflict of interest concerns if it simultaneously
owned stock in a company and pursued governmental action, such as an anti-
trust suit, against the company.
While evidence from state pension plans indicates that some investment
choices based on political reasons turned out badly," other evidence shows
that state-run defined benefit pension plans have had similar investment per-
formances to private company pension plans. 2 The Social Security program
20. If the government invests only a portion of the Social Security trust fund's assets in
investment instruments other than the special issue treasury bonds, then this decision would not
eliminate the issue, but only make it less significant
21. See DANIEL J.. MiTcHnu, WHY GovERNMaNT CONTROT =r INVESTMENT WouLD
UNDERMINE RETIREMENT SECURITY, THE HERrTAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER (Heritage
Found., Wash., D.C.), Feb. 5, 1999, at 1, 5-9, available at http'/www.heritage.org/library/
backgrounder/bgl248estml (illustrating risks of politically driven investment choices).
22. See Alicia . Munnell & Annika Sunden, Investment Practices ofState and Local
Pension Funds: Implications for Social Security Reform, in PENSIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
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can design systems that mitigate political influences in investment choices
through the use of index funds and by not allowing the government to vote in
shareholder elections. However, the long-term question for the success of the
collective investment becomes whether legislators will leave the system alone
or whether they will move to change it during a political movement against a
company or product.
The third reform option type is privatization. Privatization generally
refers to any proposal that involves creating individual accounts for each cov-
ered worker or for workers born after a certain year. In a true privatization of
the program, all payroll tax revenue would become contributions to workers'
individual accounts. The government's role would be limited to verifying
contributions and overseeing the institutions administering the accounts.
Benefit determination would depend upon the contributions to and the invest-
ment performance of the account. However, Congress has not discussed any
true privatization proposal. Most proposals are partial privatization programs
in which an individual account is carved out of or added onto the present
program and the present law benefit is scaled back or made into a flat benefit.
This type of reform option has many of the same benefits as collective
investment of the trust fund assets. Privatization would allow the investment
in equities to garner the traditionally higher rates ofreturns and would take the
assets out of special treasury issue bonds, which consequently would stop the
accumulation of assets in the trust funds that the government would need to
redeem in the future. It also establishes prefunding for some portion of bene-
fits, reducing the future liabilities needed to be paid out of current payroll taxes.
Partial privatization does have one huge difference from collective investment
of the trust funds - individuals, not the government, make the investment
choices.
Because investment in equities alone cannot ensure a financially sound
Social Security program, the government will likely use some combination of
these reform options if reform does progress. Concerns about success, fair-
ness, and feasibility surround each of these reform types. The remainder of
this Article will discuss these issues for the different reform options.
IV Concerns When Considering Reform Options
As the government considers Social Security reform, various concerns
arise about the soundness and future success of different reform proposals.
For example, any type of proposal that uses equities, either for individual
accounts or collectively, has to provide support for a future equity return and
should acknowledge and explain the risks that workers and beneficiaries




undertake. Furthermore, if the government introduces individual accounts, it
must determine how it will administer the accounts, what investment choices
it will allow, and what the costs will be. The government would most likely
also need to adjust benefits under a partial privatization reform, which impli-
cates the fairness, adequacy, and redistribution the program can achieve. Fi-
nally, the sustainability of the program after the reform and the ability to pay
for the transition to a new system are important factors in evaluating reform
options.
A. Equity Return Rate
A critical factor in the success of any reform proposal using equity
investment is the rate of return these investments will receive in the future.
The historical equity premium - the rate of return on stocks above the return
on treasury bonds - has been 3.5%.', Before the recent sharp decline in the
stock market, the very high price-earnings ratios that existed led some analysts
to suggest that the equity premium will probably not continue to be this high
over the next seventy-five years.24 In fact, in the 1999 Technical Panel on
Assumptions and Methods Report to the Social Security Advisory Board, it
is recommended that the Social Security actuaries reduce the equity premium
from 4% to 3% when they evaluate proposals that involve equity invest-
ments? Other analysts argue that the likely equity rate of return will have an
equity premium from 0.5% to 1.5% ifthetrustees' projected economic growth
rate is accurate.2 However, Dr. Peter Diamond computed that the stock
market would need to decline by 35-45% in real value, calculated atthe 1998
level, in order to sustain a future equity rate that equals the historic rate?
While evidence increasingly indicated that the future equity rate could
not meet its historic rate when the equity market's price-to-earnings ratio was
23. PeterA. Diamond, What StockMarketReturns to ExpectfortheFuture?, in ESTIMAT-
ING THE REAL RATE OF RETURN ON STOCKS OVER THE LONG TERM 20 (2001), available at
http'//www.ssab.govestimated%20mt%2OoP/*20rctum.pdf. (paper presented to Social Security
Advisory Board) (table on equity premiums).
24. See IMPlICATIONS OF INVESTING SOCIAL SECURITY FUNDS IN THE U.S. STOCK
MARKET, EBRI NOTES (Employee Benefit Research Inst, Wash., D.C.), Sept 1999, at 2-3
(summarizing studies by J.P. Morgan and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter economists concluding
equity premium between 1% and 3% is likely).
25. Soc. SEC.ADviSoRYBD., 1999 TECHICALPANELONASSUMPMIONS AND METHODS
REPORT TO THE SOCIAL SECumrYADVISORYBOARD 11 (1999), available athttp'J/www.ssab.
gov/Rpt99_TOC.html (equity premium recommendation).
26. See DEAN BAKER & MARK WEISBROT, SOCIAL SECURIrY: THEPHONYCRIsIS 95-96
(1999) (stating expected rate of return consistent with 1.5% growth rate in economy).
27. See PETER A. DIAMOND, WHAT STOCK MARKET RETURNS TO EXPECT FOR THE
FUTURE?, AN ISSUE IN BRiEF (Ctr. for Ret Research, Chestnut Hill, Mass.), Sept 1999, at 1, 3
(calculating required percentage decline needed to justify 6-7% return).
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at record high levels, the price-to-earnings ratio has subsequently fallen
substantially, potentially allowing the historic rate to meet the much lower
new levels. Yet, some still argue that the growth rate in the economy that the
OASDI Trustee's report projected is significantly lower than the past rate of
growth, which historically coincided with the rate of return in the equity
market.' Thus, an inconsistency exists in these assumptions; one should
expect that ifthe projected growth rate occurs, the equity rate would be lower.
However, economic growth and equity return do not correlate perfectly.
Consequently, one cannot readily determine the correct rate. Policies relying
solely on high market returns could potentially end up below advertised value.
Regardless of the ultimate average rate of return, the rate will not be the
same every year. The rates will periodically be either lower or higher than the
historic average rate. Consequently, when assessing policies that use equities,
using a deterministic rate of return for policies every year does not give a clear
picture of the likely results. The additional uncertainty of equities makes
predicting the soundness of the program seventy-five years in advance even
more difficult. In addition, no reasonable equity rate will eliminate the present
shortfall, but the choice of rates definitely will affect the attractiveness of such
proposals.
B. Administrative Issues of Individual Accounts
The potential introduction of individual accounts brings up a host of
issues on the administration of such accounts. For example, the plan sponsors
and administrative vendors of defined contribution pension plans offered
through employers have numerous tasks to perform, including the following:
(1) Enrolling new beneficiaries,
(2) Calculating required contributions,
(3) Sending contributions to accounts,
(4) Providing investment education,
(5) Overseeing participant investment selection and fund transfers,
(6) Managing funds,
(7) Calculating losses incurred as a result of mistakes and compen-
sating participants for financial losses due to those errors,
(10) Documenting compliance with laws and regulations,
(11) Processing benefit claims, and
(12) Purchasing annuities.
Consequently, how an individual account system deals with these tasks - who
must perform each task and how much they will do - will play an important
28. See BAKER & WEISBROT, supra note 26, at 90 (stating inconsistency between pro-
jected future growth of economy by trustees and historical return to equities as future return to
equities).
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role in the feasibility and cost of its administration. Because some of these
tasks are less important than others, this section will focus on the major
factors.
How would the government make account contributions andcredit invest-
ments to individual accounts? Analysts have discussed three such proposals:
the current payroll tax structure approach; a 401(k) approachthrough employ-
ees; and an individual retirement account approach through individuals.
Under the current payroll tax structure, virtually all employers report
quarterly to the IRS the aggregate amount they have withheld or collected in
federal income taxes and payroll taxes. However, they do not reconcile the
aggregate amounts with individuals' earnings until early the next year, when
they produce W-2 forms that they mail by the end of January. The Social
Security Administration then takes a few months to credit an individual's
earnings record with the previous year's earnings. For instance, the Adminis-
tration will not record January earnings to the individual's earnings record
until approximately sixteen months later. While this is fine under the current
system in which the individual invests no funds, in an individual account
system the sixteen-month float period of some earnings could significantly
impact the account's investment performance.
Analysts have suggested alternative solutions in which employers would
face an increase in reporting duties. These employers would treat the contri-
butions as if they offered a defined contribution plan. The employer would
have to determine monthly each employee's earnings and contributions to
their individual accounts, and then either deposit the money in a central clear-
ance agency or send it to the actual fund administrators of the employee's
choice. However, less than half of all wage and salary workers presently par-
ticipate in a pension plan.' Thus, many employers would face a new and
potentially costly administrative burden.
The Employee Benefit Research Institute commissioned a survey of small
employers on their attitudes toward Social Security individual account admin-
istration.3" While 80% of the small business decision makers were either
favorable (57%) or neutral (23 %) towards individual accounts, 48% had nega-
29. SEE CRAIG COPELAND, RETIREMENT PLAN PARTICIPATION: FuLL-TIME FuLL-YEAR
WORKERSAGES 18-64,EBRINoTEs (Employee Benefit Research Inst, Wash., D.C.), Jan. 2001,
at 1, 1 (examining retirement plan participation for full-time, full-year wage and salary workers).
30. SeeKELLYAOLSEN&DALLAsL.SAIISBURYSMALEMPflOYERSUPVEYONNDIVM-
UAL SOCIAL SECURiEY ACCOUNT ADMINISTRATION, EBRI NOTES (Employee Benefit Research
Inst., Wash., D.C.), Apr. 1999, at 1-4 (discussing small employers' views on administering
individual accounts). Matt Greenwald & Associates, Inc. conducted the survey of 500 small (5-
100 employees) businesses in November of 1998. Id. The survey sampled small-business
decision makers who are less likely than large employers to outsource payroll administration
and presumably would be more sensitive to an employer mandate. Id. In fact, only four out of
ten survey respondents used an external payroll service. Id.
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tive feelings about administering the accounts." Of those who gave a maxi-
mum dollar amount of the costs that they would be willing to accept and still
support individual accounts, approximately 60% would pay only one thousand
dollars or less annually, 32% would pay between one thousand dollars and
five thousand dollars, and 7% would pay over five thousand dollars. 2 In a
separate survey of small employers, 45% of those not offering a pension plan
cite the uncertainty of revenue as a major reason for not offering a plan.3
Furthermore, 33% of those not offering a plan say that the high cost of setting
up and administering a plan is a major obstacle. 4 Consequently, if a Social
Security reform program forces employers to administer these accounts, many
small employers would face tasks that cost or revenue concerns had deterred
them from undertaking voluntarily.
A final alternative is an individual or IRA approach. Under this alterna-
tive, individuals would be responsible for depositing their own money with a
financial institution or mutual fund provider. While this approach could elim-
inate the float issue, some analysts point out the difficulty of enforcing such
an approach, as well as the likely greater expense due to each individual set-
ting up a separate account. Group plans have an advantage, for they can nego-
tiate a lower per-person fee.3
Each approach has its drawbacks, butthe currentpayroll structure appears
to maximize the amount each individual has in their account by keeping costs
low. 6 Failure to control the costs of administering these accounts would
affect benefits significantly. For example, plans that use the higher bound of
administrative costs instead of the lower bound would reduce total annual
31. See id. at2 (noting employers' views on administering individual accounts).
32. See id. at 2-4 (noting maximum amount of administrative costs employers would
accept). Approximately 30% did not know the amount they would be willing to spend and still
support the individual accounts. Id.
33. See DALLAS L. SAiSBURYETAL.,RETIREMENTCONFMENCESURVEY2000: INCLUD-
ING RESULTS FROM THE RCS MINOR1rY SURVEY AND THE SMALL EMPLOYER RETIREMENT
SURVEY, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF (Employee Benefit Research Inst, Wash., D.C.), June 2000, at 1,
13 (listing reasons small employers do not offer retirement plans).
34. See id
35. See KELLYA. OLSEN & DALLAS L. SALISBURY, NDIVIDUAL SOCIAL SECURITY AC-
COUNTS: ISSUESASSESSiNGADmINISTRATIVEFEASIBIITYAND COSTS, EBRI SPECIALREPORT
AND ISSUE BRIEF (Employee Benefit Research Inst, Wash., D.C.), 1998, at 1,17 (noting diffi-
culties with IRAs).
36. Depending upon the services offered, even a centrally administered system could be
costly at the outset of the program. A study by the Social Security Administration estimated that
the first year's ongoing administrative costs could amount to 95-400 basis points of assets from
a 2-percentage point individual account system, although they predict that this cost as a percent
of assets will decline as the system matures. LAWRENCE E. HART ET AL., U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMIN.,
SSA"SESTMATESOFADMNISMTRATVECOSTSUNDERAc mAIR PROGRAMOFNDIVIDUAL
AccOUNTs 3 (Soo. See. Admin., Jan. 9, 2001), available at http'/www.ssa.gov/policy/pubs/
IApaper.pdf.
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benefits by as much as 23%." While this approach appears to best address the
important administrative cost issue, it still does not address the issue of the
extended float period.
How many investment services? The service features that have a signifi-
cant effect on the costs of these accounts include the frequency of permitted
fund transfers between investment options or other approved savings plans,
access to plan and investment information, and the number of investment
options offered. More services directly lead to more costs but provide more
flexibility in investment choices. Therefore, a savings plan must balance the
two. For example, a system with numerous investment options, daily inter-
fund trades, and twenty-four hour phone service would be very expensive to
administer. One of the reasons the federal employees' Thrift Savings Plan
(TSP) is a low cost plan is that it has limited choices of index funds, biannual
account statements, and monthly interfund transfers. The TSP is much differ-
ent than the 401(k) plans in which many employees presently participate,
which offer managed funds, quarterly statements, and daily interfund trans-
fers.38
Who regulates and who provides investment education? A new system
of individual accounts would necessitate a new level of regulation, as the
influx of new investors would make the climate favorable for fraud. The
government could use a number of methods to regulate these accounts. These
methods include registering participants, establishing and protecting benefi-
ciary and participant rights, setting and enforcing standards for reporting and
disclosure, balancing investment choice with risk by setting investment guide-
lines (such as by limiting the percentage a portfolio devotes to a particular
asset class), ensuring that participants adhere to the guidelines, and regulating
withdrawals.39 Predicting whether regulation will be sufficient or too burden-
some is difficult, but if the regulation of employer-sponsored plans is a guide,
regulators are likely to be active in the regulation of individual accounts.
Furthermore, one can expect active regulation because the government would
37. See CRAIG COPELAND ET AL., SOCIAL SECURJ1TYREFORM EVALUATING CURRENr
PROPOSALS, EBRI IssuE BRIEF (Employee Benefit Research Inst, Wash., D.C.), June 1999, at
10-11 (chart showing calculation of benefits at varying amounts of administrative costs); see
also infra Appendix, Chart 6, at 1226.
38. For example, the addition of managed equity funds would add costs to an individual
account system. The Investment Company Institute reported that the average operating expense
ratio for equity mutual funds in 1998 ranged from 70 basis points for large funds (with $5 bil-
lion or more in assets) to an average of 139 basis points for small funds (with assets of $250
million or less). See JOHN D. REA ET AT, OPERATING EXPENSE RATIOS, ASSETS, AND ECONO-
mjES OF SCALE IN EQuITY MUTUAL FUNDS, PERsCTIVE (Inv. Co. Inst, Wash., D.C.), Dec.
1999, at 1, 2, available at http'/www.ici.orgfpdfDper05-05.pdf (calculating average operating
expense ratio for equity mutual funds, by assets in 1998).
39. See OLSEN & SALISBURY, supra note 30, at 30-32.
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feel responsible to pay for individuals' retirements ifthe accounts do not per-
form as planned.
While the costs of this regulation are not known, the placement of that
burden will have important ramifications on the value of individual accounts.
If the workers must pay, they will receive less benefits from the account.
With government-imposed limits on the fees that administrators can charge
and onerous regulation requirements, administrators may drop out of the
market. The government could choose to subsidize the administrators for the
costs of complying with regulations, which in turn could affect the federal
budget or the defined benefit portion of the account. Whatever the choice, the
impact could be significant.
Along with regulation, the influx of new investors calls for education on
at least the basic aspects of investing. Many surveys have found that persons
in the United States have low levels of investing knowledge. Therefore,
workers need an education campaign, educational materials, and investing
seminars to equip them with the knowledge to make wise investment choices.
Further questions remain regarding who should provide this education -
employers, administrators, or the government - and how much education they
should provide.
C. "Guaranteed" Benefits
Currently, a formula determines Social Security benefits. Based on this
formula, a worker with a specific work record will receive a certain real benefit
for the duration of the worker's life. Under the current formula, the addition
of individual accounts will likely reduce the amount ofreal benefits, which are
"guaranteed" because they result from a formula, not the investment perfor-
mance of an individual account. The benefits from individual accounts could
potentially exceed guaranteed benefits, but they also risk being significantly
lower. Defenders of the present system argue that individuals should not
expose themselves to this risk as they are not equipped to handle it. They also
argue that a program should establish a basic level of benefits on which benefi-
ciaries can rely during their retirement, instead of subjecting beneficiaries to
the fluctuation ofthe stock market. Furthermore, the growing participation in
defined contribution plans has already increased workers' exposure to the risks
of the stock market. A projection of sources of retirement income for baby-
boomers based upon this trend towards defined contribution plans shows a
significant increase in income coming from "non-guaranteed" sources, such as
defined contribution plans and IRAs. °
40. SeeJACKVANDERHEI&CRAIGCOPEANDTHECHANINGFACEOFPRIVATE RET-
MENT PLANS, EBRI IssUE BRIEF (Employee Benefit Research Inst., Wash., D.C.), Apr. 2001, at
14 (chart showing composition of estimated retirement wealth for males of normal retirement age
who were born between 1936 and 1964); see also infra Appendix, Chart 7, at 1227.
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However, current law does not guarantee that Social Security benefits
will remain at their present level, creating what is called "political risk." Law-
makers have the ability to change benefit levels if they deem it necessary to
do so. Supporters of individual accounts counter that accounts invested in
equities would partially offset this political risk by having larger rate of return
possibilities and by creating ownership of the account for beneficiaries. Con-
sequently, lawmakers would have a reduced need, as well as reduced ability,
to cut total benefits. While a partial privatization system would reduce but not
eliminate political risk, introducing individual accounts would also create the
additional risk of investment. Comparing the risks is virtually impossible,
particularly when attempting to assess political risk.
D. Redistribution, Fairness, andAdequacy
The current benefit structure within the Social Security program replaces
a higher percentage of income for lower income workers than for higher in-
come workers. The program's architects intended to achieve some perceived
level of adequacy in benefits. However, Social Security also attains fairness
by allocating higher benefits to those who contribute more. Public recognition
of the program's fairness and adequacy explains its popular support. Some
studies show that redistribution between income groups is fairly neutral over
workers' lifetimes: wealthier persons tend to live longer than less wealthy
ones, which offsets the higher replacement rates for those with lower in-
comes.
41
A movement to individual accounts would alter the present redistribution
within the program. Under an individual account system, workers, regardless
of their income, are likely to retain the full amount of the percentage going to
the individual account. Thus, a smaller amount of the benefit will be subject
to the formula that favors lower income workers. 2
It is possible to adjust the guaranteed benefit in order to mitigate the
lessening of the redistribution that would occur with a straight reduction.
Possible adjustments include lowering the two higher bendpoints of the bene-
fit formula and adding a minimum benefit that would ensure a certain income
above some level. Whether these adjustments effectively offset the lessening
of the redistribution from adding individual accounts will depend upon the
magnitude of the adjustments. A potential downside to steep adjustments is
41. See Adam Carasso et al., Social Security Redistribution by Education, Race, and
Income: HowMuch and Why, in MAKINGHARD CHOICES ABOUTRETUMENT 12 (2001) (paper
presented at Third Annual Conference of Retirement Research Consortium) (discussing redis-
tribution by income quintiles).
42. See Kathryn L. Moore, Redistribution Under a Partially Privatized Social Security
System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 969,969-70 (1998) (discussing redistribution under partially privat-
ized system).
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that higher income beneficiaries may determine that a large percentage of their
benefit comes from the individual account even though they pay much more
in taxes. Consequently, if they believe that the guaranteed portion of the
benefit approaches a welfare program, they may withdraw their support for
Social Security.
Social Security also faces redistribution and fairness issues with spousal
benefits. Presently, spousal benefits redistribute income from two-earner
couples to one-earner couples. The nonworking spouse in a one-worker couple
receives 50% ofthe spouse's benefit at the normal retirement age and receives
the spouse's full benefit if the working spouse passes away. Despite also
qualifying for this benefit, both earners in a two-earner couple still pay payroll
taxes and, depending upon the couple's earning levels, may receive nothing
additional from their contributions beyond what a nonworking spouse would
receive. A two-earner couple is also disadvantaged in that, upon death, one of
the spouses is likely to receive smaller benefits than a nonworking spouse
would. In addition, a spouse must be married for ten years before qualifying
for benefits based upon the spouse's earnings.
Even without the addition of individual accounts, these benefit rules may
no longer match the present demographics of the country, given the higher
female labor force participation and divorce rates. In light of those demo-
graphic changes, the current benefit rules may actually lead to less effective
poverty prevention. If individual accounts are added, spousal benefits would
involve additional complexities, such as allocating individual account pro-
ceeds to the spouse after divorce. Consequently, Congress is likely to discuss
the issue of spousal benefits regardless of the manner in which it reforms the
program, or even in the absence of reform.4"
E. Probability ofActuarial Balance and Sustainability
The Trustees' Report used to evaluate the Social Security program's
finances relies upon an actuary model that is deterministic, meaning that each
value is constant or follows a predetermined path to an ultimate value. How-
ever, the economy does not have the same economic values every year for the
respective economic measures. For example, in a comparison of some generic
traditional reforms and one similar to the Archer-Shaw proposal using differ-
ent assumptions in which all have at least a zero actuarial balance determin-
istically, when they are analyzed stochastically all have less than a 50% proba-
bility of reaching the zero actuarial balance level with the exception of the
Archer-Shaw type proposal under the most favorable assumptions." Conse-
43. See URBAN INST., SoCIAL SECURITY: OuT OF STEP w=rHTHEMODERNFAMILY6-13
(Urban lnst 2000) (discussing spousal benefits under present system).
44. See CRAIG COPELAND, SOCIAL SECUTMY: NOT ALL REFORM APPROACHBS ARE
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quently, the achievement of actuarial balance deteministically does not nec-
essarily guarantee actuarial balance over seventy-five years. Thus, refbrm
programs need to take measures to increase the likelihood of attaining the
seventy-five year actuarial balance standard.
One should evaluate reform systems based on the odds of a given system
attaining actuarial balance in a given seventy-five year evaluation period and
the odds of it continually reaching this standard. This sustainability is impor-
tant, as the OASDI Trustees have projected that later years of the seventy-five
year period will have significantly higher cost rates than income rates. Thus,
each future evaluation period will gain a deficit year while losing a surplus
year. Consequently, one reform goal should be to bring back together these
diverging cost and income rate paths.
Individual account supporters argue that individual account proposals
will achieve sustainability by decreasing future liabilities, whereas the present
system is unsustainable without continuous tax increases or benefit cuts. In-
dividual accounts could help attain sustainability by prefhnding at least some
of the future benefits through the individual account by reducing the claims
for benefits from future worker cohorts. While prefimded individual accounts
reduce future liabilities and most likely will replace some ofthe future guaran-
teed benefits, they do not necessarily assure sustainability as some level of
guaranteed benefit will most likely still exist. Individual account proposals
could face the same problems as those that retain the guaranteed benefits, but
on a smaller scale.
In contrast, the current structure of Social Security benefit levels does not
appear to lead to sustainability. If the Trustees' intermediate assumptions are
correct, some refonus are necessaryto placethe program on sound footing. An
increase in taxes will not ensure sustainability, as demographics could change
again, causing liabilities to increase. However, measures such as indexing the
normal retirement age to changes in longevity could automatically adjust for
increased liabilities. Yet, automatically adjusting for poor economic perfor-
mance without exposing workers to ever-increasing payroll taxes is difficult.
F Transition Costs
The movement to individual accounts would mean a change in the
financing structure of the program. This movement will impose costs, as it
will divert some of the payroll tax dollars from current beneficiary benefits to
workers' individual accounts. While the present system faces a funding gap
of around $3 trillion dollars regardless of any future reforms, the transition to
9
EQUAI, EBRI NoTES (Employee Benefit Research Iast, Wash., D.C.), May 2001, at 5 (chart
showing percentile of actuarial balances for various reform proposals); see also infra Appendix,
Chart 8, at 1228.
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individual accounts will require additional upfront revenues. An estimate of
the transition costs of a proposal that uses a carve-out individual account, the
original Gregg-Breaux-Kolbe-Stenholm bill, amounted to $2.7 trillion."
Consequently, some type of fumding- or benefit-cut measure is necessary to
shift to an individual account system. One drawback is that this measure may
not lead to immediate economic benefits for the country or to the account
beneficiaries.
V Conclusion
Social Security remains a very popular program and has been successful
in helping to reduce the poverty rate for the elderly. However, analysts cur-
rently project it to have an actuarial deficit. Thus, a continuing debate exists
over how to change the program so that it can meet its promises. The current
system has some attributes that are worthy of preserving and perhaps are nec-
essary to preserve, but as critics of the present structure point out, traditional
reforms have historically left the program with a financial shortfall. These
critics contend that a new structure using individual accounts can reduce the
future liabilities attributable to the payroll taxes by prefunding part of the
benefits and by garnering additional revenue from the higher returns available
in the equity market. Yet a movement to such a system will impose transition
costs and will alter the beneficiaries' exposure to risks, the redistribution of
income within the program, and the adequacy of benefits. Furthermore, the
design of these accounts will significantly impact their cost and their ability
to "solve" the funding issue of Social Security. While prefunding with the
collective investment of assets could achieve many of the same goals as
individual accounts, it has not gained momentum in the policy arena due to the
concern surrounding government ownership of private enterprises. Finally,
whatever one's stance on Social Security reform, changes at some point are
necessary for Social Security to remain financially sound well into the future.
Therefore, careful consideration of these issues is a must.
45. See SYLVESTERJ. ScHIBER&JoHNB. SHOVEN, THEREALDEAL: THEH!sTORYAND
FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECUTrny 366 (1999) (estimating costs oftransition for various reform pro-
posals).
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